This paper examines, from a global administrative law standpoint, the crafting and administration of the anti-doping regime by the non-governmental international sports governing bodies, grouped in the Olympic Movement. It explores the inroads made by public actors (governments and courts) in the Olympic Movement's self-constructed monopoly on norms for the international sports community. Courts are playing an important role on the margin: while they rightly defer on substantive issues to the expertise and shared understanding of the sport governing bodies ('lex sportiva'), they are willing to interfere when the latter's decisions run counter to fundamental human rights and classic administrative law protections of due process. This has pressed private bodies such as the Olympic Movement to introduce new governance structures (especially the independent Court of Arbitration for Sport), mirroring those found in more strictly public international administration. There has also been a remarkable outreach to national governments, leading to hybrid public-private bodies such as the World Anti-Doping Agency. This interaction appears to be yielding satisfactory results so far.
I. Introduction
The governance of global sport, including the Olympics, involves considerable administration by private bodies and by hybrid public-private bodies. This is exemplified by the construction and administration of a complex global anti-doping regime that has far-reaching impacts on athletes, sponsors, and the viability of sports. This paper examines the extent to which this largely private governance regime has come to mirror administrative law principles that are developing in state administration and in more strictly public international administration, and addresses the puzzles of why this mirroring occurs, what its limits might be, and whether it is desirable 1 .
The international sports regime has grown rapidly in significance throughout its history.
Sports regulation is now no longer perceived as 'innocent corporatist regulation': professional athletes gain their livelihood through sport, most international and many national competitions involve enormous economic interests, and sports successes or setbacks may even have some political impact (the old Roman idea of providing 'panem et circenses ', bread and games, to appease the populace has certainly not faltered) 2 . Anti-doping regulation, in particular, touches upon something traditionally considered as within the public sphere, namely health policy.
The professional sports field is intrinsically a very international polity, in which a national wayward approach is likely to upset the global system. The international character is arguably one of the merits of sports, but it makes smooth transnational co-operation ever more indispensable and the room for dissent ever tighter. If one combines this with the growing recognition of the social role of sports in general, the isolated position of this international private regime seems to become ever more threatened and demands for good governance ever more convincing.
1 This working paper was thus heavily inspired by the innovative and comprehensive analysis of the "global administrative space" by Benedict KINGSBURY, Nico KRISCH and Richard B. STEWART (see "The Emergence of Global Administrative Law", forthcoming in Law and Contemporary Problems 68:3 (2005) ). 2 Consider the enormous importance attached by governments to hosting the Olympic Games successfully.
In our study of how elements of global governance have infiltrated this international private regulatory framework, we will first sketch out the general structure of the international sports regime and identify instances of government involvement in the fight against doping (II).
We will also provide a descriptive account of recent controversies on doping due process across different sports, so as to gain a better understanding of the problems and the developments occurring in practice (III). In order to engage in a thorough analysis of these phenomena, the paper will then inquire into the exact place of the anti-doping contentieux in the (international) legal landscape (IV) . From this basis the paper will assess the pervasiveness of typical administrative law protections in the creation of anti-doping regulation (V) and in the adjudication of international doping disputes (VI). Finally, it will draw some conclusions (VII).
II.
Outline of the international sports and anti-doping regulatory structure
II.1. Non-governmental and mixed bodies
The Olympic Movement 3 , headed by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) and further consisting of the Organization Committees of the Olympic Games (OCOGs),
International Federations (IFs, one per sport), the National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and National Governing Bodies (NGBs, one per sport per nation), is still at the heart of regulatory authority for many sports matters. This authority is linked to the Olympic Games since incorporation in the Movement's hierarchical framework and compliance with its regulations is a condition for eligibility for participation in the Olympic Games (art. 52 Olympic Charter 4 ). Its authority has gradually also been recognized by international federations of non-Olympic sports 5 .
Bigger IFs which are financially independent of Olympic Games do display a growing tendency 3 Official website: http://www.olympic.org. The Olympic Movement also contains the Paralympic Movement. 4 The Olympic Charter is retrievable at http://multimedia.olympic.org/pdf/en_report_122.pdf (last visited June 10 2005) . 5 A large number of them have grouped in the Association of IOC Recognized International Sports Federations, who in principle retain their autonomy but can opt in many Olympic Movement programs and are bound to respect the Olympic Charter.
to be reticent or even hostile towards some IOC initiatives 6 . The big American professional competitions however, such as Major League Baseball, do not adhere to the American 'national governing body' for their respective sports, such as USA Baseball, and thus operate outside the Olympic Movement framework 7 .
Thus, the Olympic Movement has a characteristic cross-hierarchical structure: while the IOC stands on top of the NOCs, it also controls the IFs for each discipline (art. 29 Olympic Charter). Those IFs then decide upon membership of a NGB 8 in its discipline and in this way supervise them. NOCs operate as national go-betweens for the selection requirements for the Olympics and in this way control the NGBs. IOC and IFs are always private associations, established according to the domestic law of a country (often Switzerland). NOCs and NGBs are ordinarily also non-governmental associations. The Olympic Movement is self-supporting: it gets its financing from the sale of broadcasting rights and sponsorship deals 9 .
In order to give a new boost to the fight against doping, the IOC set up a special antidoping enforcement body in 1999, the World Anti-Doping Agency [WADA] 10 . This organization has a mixed composition (although it is a non-governmental association in a strict legal sense) with equal representation from the Olympic Movement and governments. 
II.2. Implication of governments in the fight against doping
In most countries, the role of governments in professional 14 sports regulation is limited to passing a statute formally recognizing the NOC and giving it a very broad discretion to exclusively regulate sports matters, under a few conditions relating to due process (e.g. Ted
Stevens Amateur Sports Act 15 ). Governments often grant subsidies to the NOC. The same recognition along with broad discretion is given to NADOs with regard to doping matters. In many countries, governments establish ordinary criminal jurisdiction and lay down criminal sanctions over trainers, doctors etc. who administer and traffic in prohibited performanceenhancing substances 16 . In some countries, governments legislate to establish a list of prohibited substances and a corresponding general prohibition of doping practices by athletes. Governments will further organize and execute tests themselves at national sports events. However, as a rule, they will delegate selection procedures for testing and sanctioning authority to sports federations.
Prior recognition of the federation's disciplinary scheme is then required to guarantee minimal effectiveness and due process 17 . Finally, France has taken the governmental intervention a step further: its national sport governing bodies are listed in legislation and are said to perform a 14 I use 'professional sports' here as a short-hand for 'sports as exercised in official competitions, in the framework the Olympic Movement'. This does not necessarily imply that all athletes engage in these competitions on a professional basis (although this is of course the case in the major competitions 34 An emblematic example of the desperation with which athletes seek artificial performance boosts, of the shady environment they get implicated in, and of the peculiar interaction between the Public Prosecutor, the media and sports bodies, is provided by distinguished world-class cyclist Johan Museeuw (of Belgium). In 2004, he and 2 colleagues were suspended for 2 years by the Belgian Cycling Association (under the rules of the international federation UCI). The association had studied the transcripts of a still on-going criminal investigation into a doping trafficking ring, run by veterinarians (a milieu closely related to the violent Belgian 'beef hormones mafia' active in the 1990s), which also included the results of a highly mediatized search at Museeuw's house. Although the procedure before the association was completely secret at the request of Museeuw, several newspapers have been able to cite extensively from the criminal investigation, like page-long transcripts from text messages between Museeuw and the veterinarian in grotesque, yet revealing code language (similar information found its way to the 
English tennis player Greg Rusedski was cleared of doping charges by an Association of
Tennis Players-appointed tribunal because the positive test was likely to be caused by salt tablets press in the Marion Jones case). Although the ban hardly affected Museeuw as he had retired just before (since 2004 UCI explicitly establishes competence over cyclists who already have retired), he sued the association before courts alleging non-respect of the presumption of innocence (preferring to ignore the mandatory appeal route to the CAS). The case is pending, but it appears unlikely that Museeuw will prevail. Museeuw is still active as a PR officer for a professional cycling team with the assent of UCI, which is apparently not willing to interpret the suspension in a broad fashion. See X, "Belgian trio hit with bans", on BBC . Although the decision was reversed on procedural grounds, the CAS hinted that the mere fact that Phonak initially "raised doubts on validity and reliability of the new blood test" (on which no ruling had ever been passed by an independent judicial body) was not 'unethical' and could thus not justify the ban. the ATP (the international professional male tennis federation) itself had provided. The positive testing of Rusedski had been immediately publicly disclosed, probably unjustly damaging his reputation 37 . A similar miscarriage in the quest against doping occurred when a Belgian regional sports minister rushed to the international press, explaining that his anti-doping authorities had found that Russian tennis star Kuznetsova had taken prohibited substances when playing a tournament in Belgium. However, it quickly came to light that the substance found in her body
was not prohibited at all according to the international standards. But, arguably, the damage had been done for Kuznetsova and the whole affair led to a strong outcry by the professional tennis federation because of a perceived increase of ill-advised action on doping by government officials 38 .
In that took the fight to the cheats head on" 39 . In this respect, it is telling many of the doping violations involved doped athletes recurring to ancillary phenomena (refusal to provide body fluids, failure to provide whereabouts or straight-out fraud), whereas earlier they may have felt more confident in undergoing the testing procedures. One should also note that almost none of the IOC's actual decisions on doping during the Olympics caused wide-spread controversy 40 . It appears that the policy options and related 'jurisprudence' stemming from the 2004 Olympics (relying on the novel WADC structure) are gradually becoming established practice across the different sports, replacing controversy with greater legal security.
IV. Legal nature of the anti-doping regime

IV.1. Delineation of the question
How serious is the need for due process in sports cases? Is there something specific about sports anti-doping regulation and enforcement that means that national (or international) courts grant deference to decisions of those private/mixed sports bodies? The diffuse mix of private actors, public interest discourse and government involvement, as well as the confusion in caselaw and doctrine, make these difficult questions about the nature of 'governance' in international sports organizations.
Even if the consensus would be that doping regulation is a 'private' matter in the legal sense, a contractual issue between an athlete and an international federation subject to party autonomy, still a high level of due process would be desirable if it can come at little cost 41 . A perception of fairness and responsiveness is likely to increase internal legitimacy and credibility and thus to enhance compliance with its regulation. On the contrary, doping proceedings and sanctions against an athlete arguably interfere with the enjoyment of the athlete's fundamental personal rights: the right to privacy, the right to a good name and the right to work (also understood as 'economic freedom'). The latter is contested, but it seems difficult to deny that professional sport is to a large extent an economic activity and that a suspended athlete effectively loses his livelihood. The US 7 th Circuit Court has said that access to competition was a mere 'privilege' 43 . German courts, however, take a more fitting approach, recognizing it as a right 44 .
IV.2. The parallel with disciplinary procedures for professional misconduct
Even if doping regulation is capable of barring exercise of one's fundamental rights, this does not make human rights protections applicable to doping disciplinary procedures, nor does it imply a requirement to guarantee due process according to the US Constitution. withhold finances for federations who do not abide by the provisions of WADC") and the adoption of its content in a binding Convention (UNESCO). And finally, while the WADC is not a treaty, it was adopted by WADA, where governments have a 50%-stake, and the writing process occurred in extensive consultation with the latter.
Those elements prove that anti-doping regulation can no longer be considered as pertaining to the private, contractual sphere and that one should indeed open the door for judicial review. Anti-doping law and the proceedings brought before non-governmental instances against athletes can be best equated to civil-law style "professional" disciplinary law and disciplinary tribunals. They emerge when private professional associations (e.g. doctors, lawyers, architects…) are endowed with a government mandate to regulate their profession as they see fit, provided that they observe certain due process requirements, because of the regulation's impact both on an individual practitioner and on society in general. Classically, this would imply that the required due process guarantees of the sanctioning process are "less than the ordinary common law criminal standard, but more than the ordinary common law civil standard" (as the CAS rightly recognized 51 ). The analogy is also brought to light in the official comment on the WADC's article on the standard of proof in anti-doping proceedings 52 , which refers to the standard "applied in most countries to cases involving professional misconduct". Socio-Legal Perspectives, 2001, London, Cavendish, 58 (57-73) . Whereas he recognizes that IF doping procedures are of a disciplinary character and similar to the criminal process, he still denies applicability of the fair trial rights incorporated in the ICCPR and the Eur Cov HR (and the related jurisprudence of the ECHR). According to him those rights only apply to 'statutory disciplinary law', i.e. disciplinary law founded in formal legislation (such as medical disciplinary law). Sports disciplinary law is on the other hand 'entirely free from interference by government or parliament', so it does not fall within the realm of these conventions. The athlete can only appeal to these procedural rights which are given to him by the sports organization. I have however argued that there is significant state intervention in many ways in the doping disciplinary process, so I think the fair trial standards laid down in international public law are applicable. 
IV.3. Possibilities for review of decisions by domestic and international courts
The foregoing has a bearing on the amount of deference courts will grant to the decisions of the disciplinary commissions of the sporting bodies and especially to the awards on appeal of CAS. Indeed, the WADC provides that cases arising from 'international events' or concerning 'international-level athletes' (majority of cases) can only be appealed to CAS in Lausanne 64 .
Arbitral awards have the advantage that they are easily enforceable, both in the country of the "I think that the courts must be slow to allow an implied obligation to be fair to be used as a means of bringing before the courts for review honest decisions of bodies exercising jurisdiction over sporting and other activities which those bodies are far better fitted to judge than the courts. This is even so where those bodies are concerned with the means of livelihood of those who take part in those activities. The concepts of natural justice and the duty to be fair must not be allowed to discredit themselves by making unreasonable requirements and imposing undue burdens."
69
If, on the other hand, courts think adjudication of sports disputes falls within the sphere of self-regulation and organizational autonomy, they will refuse any review at all. Circuit Court went as far as to reject such violation by drawing the parallel that criminal defendants in the US may also be required to come forward with proof themselves as a basis for asserting affirmative defenses. It can then be understood that if it were the case that there were no similar presumptions in the ordinary American criminal law system, arbitral awards using those presumptions in doping disputes would be contravening public policy. In another classic case, a German court has effectively overstepped an international sports federation award because in its view it imposed disproportionate sanctions 79 .
It follows that doping disputes can be considered as classic civil law disciplinary proceedings, where a professional organization has received a considerable discretion to regulate its field from the state but where administrative safeguards and judicial review processes remain available at the margin to ensure fairness, natural justice, due process or respect for fundamental rights. This margin exactly conforms to the (procedural and substantive) public policy exceptions to automatic enforcement in the NY Convention. Therefore the proliferation of exclusive CAS arbitration clauses will in itself not help shield the international sports regime from courts eager to remedy due process deficiencies in the doping proceedings. Clearly, if a court adopts the view that submission to arbitration is more of a regulatory precondition than an express contractual choice, it may easily refuse enforcement of such an award under a public policy rationale 80 .
While it is still true that courts have been paying considerable deference to the regulatory autonomy of international sports federations and that very few athletes have eventually been The mixed composition of WADA and the governance disciplines that WADA later imposed upon itself, in particular the consultation processes, tend to demonstrate that the international private sports regulation community was all too conscious of the need to achieve the greatest potential legitimacy for WADA. In this vein, it could get the governments and, to a lesser extent, athletes on board so that its harmonization and co-ordination functions could prosper. Obviously, this epistemic community was deeply aware of the growing governmental initiative in the field and the latter's superior enforcement capacity, as well as of the scandaltriggered skepticism of sponsors, media and public opinion 97 towards the sports ruling class' motivation, vigorousness and effectiveness with regard to the combat against doping. The discrepancies between the approaches at the domestic and the ones at the international level, as well as the different rules in force for the various sports disciplines, did not improve the outlook.
V. Participation and accountability in the creation of anti-doping regulation
In order to preserve or even increase the benefit of governmental enforcement and private financial capacities, without at the same time losing hold of the separate status of sports within, and transcending, national society or -less romantically -losing hold of their power, top-down and uniform institutional reform at the regulating level was much needed to get a sense of renewed external legitimacy. Institutionalized participation, together with a quest towards a broader consensus in the general regulatory process of WADA, has apparently convinced governments to step on board and may very well prove to be instrumental to appease the critics of a self-dealing, inefficient private sports autocracy. 97 Those are the three factors making up the economic life-line of professional sports competitions. In fact, the most prolific scandals occurred during the 1998 Cycling Tour of Italy and the 1998 Tour de France, where national prosecutors revealed a structural, deeply-rooted doping plague, whereas sports federations' efforts up to that point had only been able to address isolated cases. Such scandals may not immediately drive all spectators and sponsors away, but is certainly pernicious for public confidence in the power-wielders' capacity to establish a level playing field for the athletes, an essential value of sports, and gave impetus to cries for reform and transparency.
But also governments are likely to benefit from a private-public partnership model like WADA as it will give them direct influence in the organizing bodies of international sports competitions. In this way, they can efficiently tackle cross-border issues related to sports that also happen to be of general public interest, without having to engage in a lengthy and burdensome exercise of control and command regulation at the national or international level.
The WADA model could for instance be employed in the future to foster programs for sports competitions for disabled people, to combat racism in sport or to halt spectator violence. Of course this will only work if a majority of governments agree on the desirability of a given policy, but if this is the case, the joining of forces with the established international private sports apparatus will give them more leverage to persuade dissenting governments to follow the majority's course than if they have to achieve it through inter-state diplomacy. The international sports bodies can then effectively enforce the policies through exclusions from competition, canceling of events and many others subtle sticks and carrots in the context of international competition. WADA, through the wide-spread governmental backing it enjoys, through the effective tools it has created on that basis, but also through its organizational independence (incorporation in the existing private structure), appears far better equipped to deal with instances of structured and state-organized doping practices, such as apparently occurred in the Eastern bloc countries in the 70s and 80s, than both the Olympic Movement as the Western governments separately ever were. Much will however depend on the perceived legitimacy of those sports bodies and therefore it is so essential that they achieve a high level of transparency, consistency and participation in their operations.
For now, the participatory processes in the norm creating activity of WADA only cater to its direct competitors: the various sports federations and governments. WADA is only accountable for its general regulation through the supervisory task of the state representatives in its organs, yet no system of legal accountability is currently operative. The CAS, which must adjudicate disputes according to the applicable regulations themselves, and, subsidiarily, according to the rules of law chosen by the parties, the law of the country where the federation has its seat or the rules of law the Panel deems appropriate 98 , has to date only been willing to disregard generally applicable rules and standards when they appear to be contrary to natural justice, which seems the case when they unreasonably infringe upon fundamental rights of defense in a sanctioning proceeding. Despite some hints in the other direction 99 , the CAS seems not prepared to consistently engage in judicial review of the anti-doping rules and standards of international sports federations. This once again runs parallel with the threat posed by actors from outside the international sports regime: as argued above, they will grant a lot of deference to the rules and practices of the federations except for when these violate traditional due process guarantees for disciplinary proceedings. As long as there is no danger of national courts stepping in to apply their national administrative law protections to the norm-creating process, there seems no incentive for CAS to fill the void 100 . Moreover, art. 4.3.3 WADC expressly provides that WADA's determination of the Prohibited Substances List shall be final and not be subject to challenge by an athlete or other person on the merits of its inclusion. In the context of the centralization of the authority and capacity in WADA, operating under the patronage of government 101 , this seems unsatisfactory even if we take the need into account for an effective anti-doping policy. A manufacturer of food supplements could find his product from one day to the other added on the list of prohibited substances without being preventively informed 102 , let However, his account of an 'ideological diversity' appears rather injudicious: just from practice -e.g. the Olympic Games -it would seem that there exists at least more of a worldwide understanding, a common sports ethos, than in many other social activities. Of course one cannot deny that the budget available for sport, from both public and private sources, differs very substantially across countries. Indeed, the North-South divide has cast a shadow on the paradigm of equal opportunity for all in sports. But this can evidently not be seen as idiosyncratic to the sports domain, nor would it be any better addressed by a more flexible stance of the regime power-wielders on the doping issue. One must also note that the IOC is far from insensitive to the distributional problem, since it runs an important 'Olympic Solidarity' program that provides funding to sports programs of developing countries.
VI. The role of due process in the adjudication of international doping control disputes
Having considered the governance principles of the norm yielding process in the international sports domain, this section will take a closer look at the presence of classical due process guarantees for suspected athletes in the actual prosecution and sanctioning activities of the sports federations. First I will look at a more general effort of WADA to increase the credibility of the doping control process and then I will discuss some specific, widely recognized elements of disciplinary /criminal due process.
VI. 1. WADA Office of the Independent Observer
Although WADA has some power to monitor and sanction non-compliance with the WADC 104 , it has deemed it useful to create an independent auditing office, the Office of the Independent Observer [OIO] 105 , for the doping control process at important international sports competitions, such as the Olympic Games and that on a voluntary basis. If a sports competition so requests, an 'Independent Observers' team will observe the doping controls and subsequently publish a report on all aspects of the process. With the broader objective of enhancing athlete, sport and public confidence in the anti-doping operations, it seeks to ensure a fair, transparent and impartial doping control process. Actual team members are 'experts' with a medical, legal or athletic background and are selected by WADA from a pool it has established. In its first 2 years of operations (it started its task at the 2000 Summer Olympics) it was fully funded by the European Community 106 . It is a fine example of a system that uses peer review to establish peer and 'public-reputational' accountability 107 . But such accountability stands and falls with the perceived objectivity and competence of the reviewing bodies. It appears that, for now, the OIO system has not built up the credit among sports federations 108 , athletes and the general public so as to make the case that they act as "the eyes and ears of the world" 109 in the doping control process. But, in view of the increasing number of invitations it receives from international sports competitions to monitor their proceedings, this currently very toothless governance tool could develop into an important policy driving force in the longer term, provided it produces highquality and consistent reports 110 .
VI. 2. Evolution in due process protections for the individual athlete
VI.2.1. At the outset: the jurisprudence of the CAS The CAS is a vital actor in the protection of athletes' due process rights. As mentioned above, the WADC and the statutes of most sports federations provide for an exclusive appeal of doping sanctioning proceedings to the CAS, upon exhaustion of legal remedies available within the concerned federation 111 . One should also be reminded that the applicable substantive law in a CAS appeal will be the applicable federation regulations, the rules of law of the domicile of the sports federation (or the law agreed upon by the parties) and the further rules of law the Panel deems appropriate 112 . On this basis, the Court has held in an advisory opinion that all decisions of sports federations should respect general principles of (national and international) law, and in particular the right to personality of the accused athlete, among other human rights 113 .
Subsequent Panels have frequently reviewed federations' regulations for compliance with general principles of law, without rooting them in one specific legal system, not even international law as such 114 . As a true constitutional court would, CAS will allow sports federations to derogate from some of these recognized due process protections if they can assert 108 The cycling IF, UCI, that for the first time invited the OIO to the 2003 Tour de France, outrightly questioned the objectivity of the latter in its reaction to the OIO's report (see WADA website, OIO section, UCI comment, p.50). 109 As the section on the OIO on the WADA website claims. 110 A quick survey of different reports leads to the conclusion that while for high-profile events they are extensive and well-documented, for smaller events they are short and somewhat parochial. 111 CAS Code R47.
an adequate justification, relying on the importance and necessities of the fight against doping 115 .
Another salient feature of CAS appellate proceedings is that the CAS has full power to review both the facts and the law of the case, so the appellate hearings will be 'de novo' and, arguably, NGBs and IFs would now pronounce a temporary suspension. The athlete will be invited to appear for a disciplinary hearing 'board' or 'commission' of the federation. He has the right to be 115 E.g. CAS, USA Shooting, see FN 99, 193, 116 CAS Code R47 (with reference to R44.3); OSCHUTZ, l.c., 679 117 CAS Cullwick v FINA, No. 96/149 [1997] , CAS Digest I, 251, [258] [259] In my account of the historical situation and the growing discontent of the American federations, I rely heavily on the due process critiques in the article of STRAUBEL (l.c.) and from thereon try to construe a typical process.
assisted by counsel and has leave to inspect his file beforehand. However, he will have very limited (if any at all) rights to ask for production of other documentation or discovery. In a few instances, federation provisions may only allow him to present his evidence in writing and in others, the right to bring witnesses to the stand and cross-examine them is very limited. Hearings always take place at the headquarters of the federation 119 , which could impose a serious financial burden upon athletes. The hearing board will often be made up of officials deeply embedded in the daily operations of the federation, although sometimes retired athletes may also sit in the board. The board is chosen by the parties from a not very extensive list created by the federation.
At times, officials who prosecuted the athlete would also sit in the hearing panel. After the hearing, the board will take a decision, which in some cases (e.g. International Amateur Athletics acquittal of an athlete by its own NGB, so that it will intervene and initiate its own sanctioning process. The IF will often pronounce a provisional suspension of the athlete and invite him for a hearing before its disciplinary board that often affords less due process guarantees than the NGB hearing 121 . The IF's rule will then in general allow for an appeal to the CAS.
It is obvious that many aspects of this process are problematic. On the national level the guarantees for a fair hearing have been extended. In the U.S. 122 the Amateur Sports Act requires NGBs to provide "fair notice and opportunity for a hearing before declaring an athlete Art. 7 WADC sets out the result management process, providing for notification after a positive A-result, the right to attend the analysis of the B-sample and the right to request laboratory documents, but expressly allows for provisional suspension after notification of a positive A-result, provided that the athlete is given an opportunity for a provisional hearing before imposition of the suspension (or on a timely basis promptly after the imposition) or an opportunity to have an expedited full hearing on a timely basis after the imposition (art. 7.5). Art.
8 WADC then lays down the requirements for the (full) hearing process, at the end of which a definitive sanction can be imposed: a timely hearing before a fair and impartial (yet not independent) body is required and inter alia also the right to have assistance of counsel (at athlete's expense), to present evidence and call witnesses (testimony can be restricted to a written submission) and to a written, reasoned decision. Art. 14 WADC still allows for public disclosure of the fact that an athlete tested positive, even when the B-sample has not yet been tested (a minor internal administrative review of the A-result is required) 128 . Art. 13 guarantees an appeal to CAS 129 . The American National Anti-Doping Organization, USADA, has gone even further 130 and now provides for a preliminary hearing ('probable cause hearing') by an independent expert Review Board, to be followed by a full-fledged hearing in the form of a trialtype proceeding with independent AAA arbitrators 131 who will decide on the sanctions. IFs are invited to observe the proceedings, while an (exclusive) appeal to CAS is open to all interested parties. Interestingly, the two latest athletes to be charged by USADA (on the basis of documentary evidence in Balco) have taken the opportunity provided by USADA regulations to immediately seize the CAS, completely bypassing the trial-type instance before an AAA Panel.
They consider the AAA Panels to be partial and too closely linked to USADA 132 .
It should also be mentioned that not only the impartiality of the federations' disciplinary boards has been challenged, but also that of the arbitration panels. The CAS had a massive legitimacy problem in its first 10 years of existence: the IOC funded the CAS entirely while its 128 Art.14 furthermore imposes the obligation to publicly disclose positive results after an anti-doping violation has been determined (i.e. after the hearing The World Anti-Doping Code, if correctly implemented in the following years by the different federations, is likely to be successful to bring the doping control processes in conformity with internationally recognized principles of a fair hearing (or procedural due process), except on one point. The continuing possibility to suspend an athlete before any hearing has taken place (even if it will follow at short notice) and also the disclosure to the public of the results before a hearing 136 appears very much at odds with generally recognized legal principles of disciplinary law in civil law countries, or of similar types of cases in common law countries, and with specific national legislation (such as the ASA in the US). One can not yet discount the prospect of successful challenges before state courts (with a possibility to recover for damages). The fact that WADC does not require the disciplinary body that determines the sanction in first instance to be totally independent from the prosecuting sports federation, seems less prone to be considered as a violation of due process as long as independent appeal procedures such as a CAS appeal are reasonably available.
VI.2.3. "Everyone … shall be presumed innocent until proven guilty by law"
In the doctrine there is a heavy debate to what extent doping sanctioning processes should reflect the substantive due process guarantees of criminal proceedings and about whether there can even be found an international consensus on what those guarantees in criminal proceedings actually are. Consideration of these matters goes beyond the purposes of this paper 137 . In the pre-WADC era numerous regulations contained indeterminate incriminations, rejected the possibility to present exculpatory evidence -or left it open -, or did not allow for any flexibility in the imposition of sanctions. The lack of a unified approach and the differences in the conceptions of what due process required were a fertile breeding ground for conflicts between NGBs and IFs and for recourses of athletes to their national courts invoking a denial of fundamental justice and thus a violation of public policy 138 . The CAS has consequently received a string of cases challenging the imposition of sanctions on the ground that the presumption of innocence of the athletes was disregarded. As OSCHUTZ 139 demonstrates in much greater detail, the Court has used its competence to apply general principles of international law to interpret the IOC's and IF's regulations very loosely. In this way it has adopted the 'lex mitior'-principle 140 , it has rejected the applicability of provisions establishing doping violations that lack clarity 141 , and has reduced the length of suspensions to reflect the circumstances of the cases (proportionality principle), even when the rules contain fixed sanctions 142 . Furthermore, it has established that respect for an athlete's 'right of personality' entails that he, in order to avoid a suspension, must have the opportunity to rebut a presumption that the presence of a prohibited substance in his body is due to the athlete's intent or negligence. 143 As one commentator rightly observes, the CAS, by freely using general, non-state specific doctrine, is staking out the prerogative to develop its own jurisprudence and independence 144 . It appears, at least in those appeal processes, to have taken up the role as the sports regime's watchdog over individual rights. The CAS seems better equipped than national courts in this respect, as it will develop expertise and jurisprudence and can operate above the different national legal systems, while being effective in each one of them (due to the easy recognition of arbitral awards). This would be of course on the assumption that the CAS would build up the necessary credibility with national courts as an equivalent monitoring instrument for the respect of fundamental rights and due process within this specialized field. However, while its potential has been recognized 145 , it has had difficulty establishing clear and consistent jurisprudence on some issues 146 .
For that reason, the enactment of the WADC has been more than welcome to provide more legal security. Apparently very conscious of doctrinal critiques 147 and the incursions of national courts in the doping control regime 148 , while simultaneously concerned about the effectiveness of the combat against doping, the drafters have, at least on paper, succeeded to find a comfortable middle ground and clarified long-lasting controversies. So does the Code only provide for 'strict liability' offences (without a possibility for a defendant to prove lack of negligence and intent in his conduct) with a view to disqualifications (which is in essence an ingame measure), while such possibility does exist to avoid genuine sanctions such as suspensions (art. 10.5. 
VII. Conclusion
The international private sport anti-doping regime has gradually overcome many original deficiencies in accountability and responsiveness by means of top-down, self-disciplining acts of adding good governance mechanisms and due process requirements (most notably, through establishing WADA and enacting the WADC and by allowing the CAS to operate independently).
Most of these governance processes originate from a corporatist reflex as the international sports federations are under constant pressure from governmental officials (who are getting more involved in the general regulatory process) and national judges (who could be more and more tempted to review the anti-doping enforcement process).
The transnational reach of sports regime bodies is not in itself experienced as problematic, as it is an inherent and historical characteristic of the field in which a large amount of common understanding across the borders is already present. International co-operation and development through hierarchical structures are long-standing features of the Olympic Movement. The tension in the field, at both the national and international level, mainly centers around the question whether there exists a different nature for 'lex sportiva' that would justify departure from general legal concepts and traditional regulatory structures, a question ever more prevalent now that sports has a growing impact on other areas, more immediately considered of general public interest. Since the general public sphere has only a very limited transnationally shared vocabulary (contrary to the global sports world 'dèmos' that appears to exist) efforts to embed the private sports regime at the international level in a general state-powered structure are only feasible at the margin: through establishing vague, general guidelines for the sports world in international conventions, through entering into partnerships with the private federations (as in WADA), and through allowing for limited review in national (and international) courts for compliance with fundamental human rights norms. But exactly those impulses at the margin will arguably continue to foster and direct the self-disciplining process of the Olympic Movement. If
